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Abstract
China claims the Spratly Islands and other three maritime features in the South 
China Sea. Four ASEAN countries, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Brunei, dispute the sovereignty of the Spratly Islands with China. The rise of 
China in recent years is obvious and Chinese fishing boats, patrol vessels of the 
maritime security agencies, and PLA navy gunboats are deployed in the South 
China Sea. Chinese diplomats also label the South China Sea as a core interest, 
on par with Taiwan and Tibet. The ASEAN members’ armed forces are not well-
equipped and cannot compete with the PLA navy. Therefore, they use ASEAN 
conference diplomacy to cope with the Chinese maritime offensive although it 
is difficult for ASEAN members to unify their policy toward China. This paper 
looks into the rise of China in South China Sea conflict and its impact on ASEAN 
conference diplomacy. The paper also tries to examine some prospects of ASEAN 
conference diplomacy under Chinese pressure.
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Introduction 
China joined ASEAN conference diplomacy, a series of multilateral international 
conferences held by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in 
1991. In the beginning, China enjoyed ASEAN conferences, such as the ASEAN-
China Ministerial Meeting, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and ASEAN-China 
Summit, because Chinese diplomats felt comfortable with the consensus-based 
regime. However, they found some difficulties in the agenda such as sovereignty 
issues in the South China Sea.
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The Republic of China (ROC) drew a broken U-shaped line in the map of the 
South China Sea in 1947, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) drew the 
similar, but not equivalent line in 1953. The two Chinese regimes claimed four 
islands and maritime features in the U-shaped line as Chinese territory: the Pratas 
Islands, the Paracel Islands, the Macclesfield Bank, and the Spratly Islands.1 
Four ASEAN nations, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, dispute 
the sovereignty of the Spratly Islands with China. In March 1988, the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) attacked the Vietnamese Navy near the Spratly 
Islands, sinking two Vietnamese troopships and wrecking another.2 Vietnam also 
disputes the sovereignty of the Paracel Islands and some parts of the continental 
shelf with China.
The Philippines disputes the sovereignty of Scarborough Shoal (China claims 
it is part of the Macclesfield Bank) with China. China’s economic and military 
rise in East Asia aggravated these disputes. Chinese fishing boats, maritime 
surveillance ships for oil detection, maritime security agencies, and the PLAN are 
all deployed in the South China Sea and maritime disputes with ASEAN members 
have occurred.
ASEAN foreign ministers have won the backing of some external dialogue 
partners such as the United States and Japan in the ARF, and ASEAN leaders are 
unified and negotiate collectively during ASEAN-China Summit Meetings and 
ASEAN-China Ministerial Meetings. China has tried to avoid sensitive agendas at 
the ARF and collective negotiations with ASEAN members over South China Sea 
conflicts. They try instead to settle these issues bilaterally, and in some cases have 
utilized ASEAN members to interfere in ASEAN conference diplomacy.
This paper looks into the rise of China in the South China Sea and its impact 
on ASEAN conference diplomacy. The paper is composed of four parts. The first 
part explains the features of ASEAN conference diplomacy. The second part 
provides case studies indicating China’s preference for bilateral negotiations. The 
third part provides the case studies showing China’s challenge and interference 
with ASEAN conferences in accordance with its economic and military rise. The 
fourth part provides prospects for South China Sea conflicts relevant to ASEAN 
conference diplomacy under Chinese pressure.
            
1 Peter Kien-Hong Yu, “The Chinese (Broken) U-Shaped Line in the South China Sea: 
Points, Lines, and Zone,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, no. 3 (December 2003): 407; Li 
Guoqiang, “The Frontier Issue between China and Its Neighbouring Countries,” Japan Border 
Review, no. 1 (2010): 51 (Japanese).
2 Jane’s Defence Weekly (May 28, 1988): 1072.
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　Figure 1: China’s Broken U-shaped Line in the South China Sea
　Figure 1 originally appeared in Sato, Koichi 2010, “China’s ‘Frontiers’ Issues
　 Concerning Territorial Claims at Sea,” Japan Border Review, No. 1, p. 23 
　(Japanese), Slavic Research Center at Hokkaido University.
1. ASEAN Conference Diplomacy: Features and 
Roles
ASEAN was established on August 8, 1967 at a meeting in Bangkok between 
the foreign ministers of Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, and 
the deputy prime minister of Malaysia (i.e., ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM)).3 
The objective of establishing ASEAN was to find a way around difficulties in 
regional cooperation caused by setbacks in the Association of Southeast Asia 
(ASA), established by the Federation of Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand in 
3 The description of ASEAN in this section is based on Sato (March 2004): 10-11.
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1961, and MAPHILINDO, established by Indonesia, the Federation of Malaya, 
and the Philippines in 1963.
This was during the Vietnam War, and although economic conditions of 
member states varied, and many had ethnic and territorial disputes with each other, 
the communist offense was imminent, and the political will for cooperation among 
the non-communist states in Southeast Asia was indispensable. The only thing 
these countries had in common was anti-communism, but their armed forces were 
poorly equipped, and they could not compete with the communist powers such 
as the Soviet Union and China. Since their weak cohesion did not permit them to 
establish ASEAN by treaty, they instead established ASEAN by declaration.4
ASEAN has been delicate and unreliable, yet it has survived for 43 years as 
the primary regional entity for cooperation in political, economic, cultural, and 
other fields. Further, Cambodia joined ASEAN as the tenth member state in 1999; 
with the exception of Timor-Leste, ASEAN has now become an all-inclusive 
organization in Southeast Asia, and has demonstrated its influence as conference 
organizer in the Asia-Pacific region.
How did ASEAN survive and develop this role? The key to ASEAN’s 
success lies in its conference diplomacy, which is based on the ASEAN Way, 
which consists of some vague principles like consensus, non-interference, and 
informality.5 The ASEAN Way is not a clear concept for understanding ASEAN’s 
conference diplomacy. However, six features of ASEAN conference diplomacy 
can be organized as principles of the “ASEAN regime.” The first feature is lenient 
management of conferences in which there are no prerequisites on attendance and 
a decision-making procedure based on consensus. The second is that maintaining 
dialogue takes priority over the settlement of conflict among attendants.
The ASEAN regime is a soft regime, and these two features were originally 
intended to relax member states engaged in conflict with each other, but they have 
become important features that have also attracted external dialogue partners to 
international conferences established by ASEAN, if only because the pace of these 
conferences is comfortable for every attendant.
The third feature is that ASEAN uses conferences to increase ASEAN unity 
and foster the development of regional cooperation. For example, ASEAN 
internal conferences have been used to materialize long-term objectives such as 
the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and advance mutual interests such as the 
political settlement of the Cambodian conflict.6 In conferences held with ASEAN 
4 ASEAN’s International Relations, ed. Tatsumi Okabe (Japan Institute of International Affairs, 
1977 (Japanese).
5 Straits Times, July 25, 1998; Yoneji Kuroyanagi, 35 Years of ASEAN (Yushindo Publisher, 
2003 (Japanese)); Koichi Sato, ASEAN Regime (Keiso Shobo Publisher, 2003 (Japanese)).
6 ASEAN could not settle the Cambodian conflict, but ASEAN’s Jakarta Informal Meeting on 
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and external dialogue partners, ASEAN takes a collective negotiation approach, 
aligning member states’ requirements, such as with export incentives when 
bargaining over the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA).
ASEAN states had been afraid of both Chinese absorption of foreign direct 
investment and Chinese domination of the world market with inexpensive goods. 
For this reason, Singaporean leaders have repeatedly stated their concerns to 
Chinese leaders since 1997.7 To calm ASEAN leaders, in 2000 China suggested 
establishing the ACFTA, and through collective negotiation ASEAN leaders 
succeeded in obtaining an expansion of import quotas for agricultural goods and a 
generous “early harvest provision” from the Chinese government.8
The fourth feature is that three ASEAN Conferences, the AMM, the Post-
Ministerial Conferences (PMC) with external dialogue partners (established in 
1979), and the ASEAN Summit (established in 1976), are the main “conference 
makers.” New international conferences are established to strengthen the 
organization and modify it in accordance with changes in the international 
environment. The establishment of two conferences, the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Conference (APEC) in 1989, and ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, and 
South Korea) meetings in 1997 were in response to the strategy and stalemate 
of talks on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the rise of 
economic regionalism.
The fifth feature is that ASEAN reserves all or part of the right to sponsor and 
chair these meetings (ASEAN countries take turns hosting conferences) so it 
can extend its influence on international relations in the Asia Pacific.9 ASEAN’s 
conference diplomacy is congenial to all member states for the reasons stated 
above; it also has merit for smaller external dialogue partners because its small 
state group members’ initiative for sponsorship and chairmanship allows it to 
avoid the pressure of major powers on its agenda.
This equality among members is the main reason the APEC, ARF (established 
in 1994), Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM, established in 1996), ASEAN+3 Summit 
Meetings (ASEAN+3, ASEAN-Japan, ASEAN-China, and ASEAN-Korea, 
established in 1997), East Asia Summit (EAS, established in 2005), ASEAN 
Cambodia (JIM) was part of the settlement process. Straits Times, February 23, 1989; Yoneji 
Kuroyanagi, “Cambodian Peace Process and ASEAN Countries,” in Southeast Asia in the 
Post-Cambodian Era, ed. Tatsumi Okabe (Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1992), 28-51 
(Japanese).
7 Straits Times (November 28, 1997).
8 Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China, Phnom Penh, November 4, 
2002, http://www.aseansec.org (accessed October 6, 2012).
9 Asia Pacific Region in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. Tatsumi Okabe (Japan Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs, 1995) (in Japanese).
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Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM, established in 2006), and ASEAN Defense 
Ministers Meeting + 8 (ADMM+8, established in 2010) have survived.
Sixth, ASEAN heads of government and ministers stress the need for 
informality during intensive and secret consultations. Ministerial retreats such as 
the ASEAN Economic Ministers Retreat (AEM Retreat, established in 1994), and 
AMM Retreat (established in 1999) were established for sensitive agendas.
An achievement of these six features was the Declaration of the Conduct 
of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) during the ASEAN-China Summit 
at the ASEAN+3 Summit Meetings in 2002.10 ASEAN members established a 
consensus-based ASEAN-China Summit (the first and fourth features) in 1997, 
took the chairmanship (the fifth feature), maintained the dialogue on the South 
China Sea conflict with China for peaceful settlement (the second feature), and 
conducted many collective and some informal negotiations with China (the third 
and sixth features). Finally, ASEAN members agreed with Chinese leaders on the 
declaration.
2. China’s Preference for Bilateral Negotiations
Chinese diplomats traditionally prefer bilateral to multilateral negotiations, 
but ASEAN’s conference diplomacy was lenient and comfortable and became 
popular among Asia-Pacific nations after the Cold War. This was the reason China 
began joining ASEAN conference diplomacy in 1991. However, the Philippine 
government denounced the PLAN’s occupation of a part of the Spratly Islands 
known as Mischief Reef in February 1995, and ASEAN foreign ministers 
published a statement expressing their serious concern.11
The PLAN built military posts in the reef, and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian 
Qichen attended ASEAN conferences for multilateral negotiations, agreeing with 
ASEAN members to begin multilateral negotiations (ASEAN-China Ministerial 
Meeting).12 On the other hand, the Chinese government negotiated bilaterally 
with the Philippine government. ASEAN’s conferences obtained no dazzling 
results, but bilateral negotiations with the Philippines produced a joint statement 
in August 1995.13
10 Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, Phnom Penh, 
November 4, 2002, http://www.aseansec.org (accessed October 6, 2012).
11 Far Eastern Economic Review (February 23, 1995):14-16; Statement by the ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers on the Recent Developments in the South China Sea, March 18, 
1995, http://www.aseansec.org/2554.htm (accessed July 31, 2008).
12 Far Eastern Economic Review (August 10, 1995): 14-16.
13 Joint Statement on PRC-RP Consultations on the South China Sea and on Other 
Area of Cooperation, August 10, 1995; Foreign Affairs Quarterly 1, no. 1 (January-
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The PLAN renovated and expanded the military posts in Mischief Reef in late 
October 1998.14 It had the appearance of a military base, and relations between 
China and the Philippines were aggravated again. Philippine President Joseph 
Estrada noted during the ASEAN-China Summit meeting that the Spratly Islands 
now “will continue to be a burden” in ASEAN-China relations as long as there 
is “an inclination to commit covert acts” and present the other side with a fait 
accompli.15 Estrada was apparently alluding to China’s expansion of structures 
first built on Mischief Reef in 1995 and its delayed notice to Manila about 
the construction activity. The Philippine effort to check the Chinese maritime 
ambition through ASEAN conference diplomacy led to the DOC in 2002.
The Philippine government also expected U.S. military support during the 
South China Sea conflict based on the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty. But 
the treaty itself does not cover the Spratly Islands, and the Philippine government 
lost U.S. confidence when the Philippine medical team withdrew from Iraq 
following the kidnapping of a Filipino driver in July 2004.16 In response, the 
Chinese government suggested the joint development of maritime resources to 
the Philippine government. Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo agreed 
with the Chinese proposal. China and the Philippines accepted Vietnam as a third 
partner and conducted a joint maritime seismic undertaking near the Spratly 
Islands from March 2005 to July 2008, though no successful result was reported.17
China’s preference for bilateral negotiations over ASEAN conference 
diplomacy became more obvious in 2009. Ambassador Xue Hanqin, Chinese 
Ambassador to ASEAN, said in a speech in Singapore, “The whole issue of 
South China Sea is not a matter between ASEAN as an organization and China, 
but among the relevant countries. ASEAN could serve as a valuable facilitator 
to promote mutual trust among the Parties, but not turn itself into a party to the 
dispute.”18 This was the origin of China’s challenge toward ASEAN conference 
diplomacy.
March 1999).
14 Straits Times, November 11, 1998.
15 Kyodo News International, “China Criticized over Spratlys at ASEAN-China 
Meeting,” December 16, 1998, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mOWDQ/is_1998_
Dec_21/ai_53484043 (accessed August 7, 2008).
16 Dana Robert Dillon, “Crisis in the Philippines: What Does it Mean for the U.S.?” 
July 18, 2005, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/07/crisis-in-the-
philippines-what-does-it-mean-for-the-us (accessed October 5, 2012).
17 “Oil Companies of China, the Philippines and Vietnam Signed Agreement on South China 
Sea Cooperation,” March 15, 2005, http://ph.china-embassy.org/eng/sgdt/t187333.htm 
(accessed October 5, 2012).
18 Xue Hanqin, “China-ASEAN Cooperation: A Model of Good-Neighbourliness and 
Friendly Cooperation” (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, November 19, 
2009).
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3. The Rise of China and Its Challenge and 
Interference with the ASEAN Conference 
Diplomacy
The rise of China in recent years is obvious. China’s defense budget and Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) exceeded that of Japan in 2007 and 2010, respectively.19 
Some Japanese China watchers, such as Akio Takahara, said China’s foreign 
policy had shifted from a low-profile “tao guang yang hui you suo zuo wei” (keep 
a low profile, hide your nails, concentrate your efforts on domestic issues, and 
develop your power) policy to an active “jianchi tao guang yang hui juji you suo 
zuo wei” (maintain the stance of “keep a low profile, hide your nails,” and “develop 
your power,” more actively) at an ambassadorial meeting at the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry in July 2009.20 This might have been the beginning of the Chinese 
diplomatic offensive.
In March 2010, Chinese officials, including Assistant Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Cui Tiankai and State Councilor Dai Bingguo told two visiting senior 
Obama administration officials, Jeffrey A. Bader and James B. Steinberg, that 
China would not tolerate any interference in the South China Sea, which they 
considered part of China’s “core interest” of sovereignty.21 This was the first time 
19 Incremental Militaristic Antipathy against China Would Be the Great Loss for Japan, 
http://j.people.com.cn/94474/7560772.htm (accessed October 6, 2012 (Japanese)); 
Actual Chinese Defense Budget Is 1.7 Times Official Budget, http://www.asahi.com/
world/china/news/TKY201203040496.html (accessed October 6, 2012 (Japanese)).
20 Akio Takahara, “The Capture Incident of the Chinese Fishing Boat and the Future of 
Japan-U.S.-China Relations,” Japan Press Club (October 22, 2010): 3-4, http://www.jnpc.or.jp/
files/2010/10/b0cd1e08c67c4abc748c385415a10081.pdf (accessed April 29, 2011). Underlines 
attached by the present author.
21 Edward Wong, “Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power,” New York Times, April 
23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/world/asia/24navy.html?pagewanted=all&_
r=0 (accessed October 6, 2012; Ian Storey, “China’s Missteps in Southeast Asia: Less 
Charm, More Offensive,” http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_
news%5D=37294 (accessed May 23, 2012). A Chinese researcher denied the Chinese official’s 
comment on “core interest.” He told this author that it had been a mistake by the translator or 
note-taker and that the Chinese officials had only told U.S. counterparts, “Peaceful resolution 
of the South China Sea is China’s core interest,” (author’s interview with a Chinese researcher 
in Singapore on March 7, 2013). It cannot be known which is true, though it is clear China 
prefers not to escalate the issue. Nevertheless, the first appearance of the term “core interest” 
was in the U.S.-China Joint Statement in Beijing on November 17, 2009, regarding Taiwan 
and territorial integrity: “The two sides agreed that respecting each other’s core interests is 
extremely important to ensure steady progress in U.S.-China relations.” U.S.-China Joint 
Statement, Beijing, November 17, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-
joint-statement (accessed September 29, 2012). This author owes special thanks to Mr. Kinichi 
Yoshihara, President of Asian Forum Japan for this information. China could possibly have 
misunderstood the joint statement as evidence that the U.S. would tacitly permit China’s free 
hand on territorial issues with neighboring countries.
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the Chinese labeled the South China Sea as a core interest, on par with Taiwan and 
Tibet.
Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo restated the South China Sea as a core 
interest at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in May 2010.22 U.S. 
counterpart, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, immediately responded 
with her disagreement. She said in an interview with the Australian, “If they were 
in the process of extending their efforts to claim and control to the detriment of 
international law, freedom of navigation, maritime security, the claims by their 
neighbors, that was a concerning matter.”23
The Sino-U.S. debate on the South China Sea was repeated at the ARF in 
Hanoi in July 2010. Secretary Clinton announced a major shift in White House 
policy on the South China Sea conflict.24 Describing the sea as “pivotal” to 
regional security, and freedom of navigation as a U.S. national interest, Secretary 
Clinton announced that Washington was prepared to play a more proactive role 
in implementing confidence-building measures that ASEAN and China had failed 
to reach agreement on since 2002. The United States was not the only country 
to push back against Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea.25 Twelve 
countries raised the issue at the ARF, including the four ASEAN claimants 
(Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei), and Indonesia.
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi took an hour-long break and returned 
to the ARF meeting with his own strong worded statement.26 He argued that the 
situation in the South China Sea was peaceful, and that the rapid growth of trade 
was evidence that navigational freedom had “obviously not” been hindered. Yang 
also insisted that “channels of discussion” between China and ASEAN were “open 
and smooth.” Finally, he cautioned other countries against internationalizing the 
South China Sea territorial disputes: “It will only make matters worse and the 
resolution more difficult. International practices show that the best way to resolve 
such disputes is for countries concerned to have direct bilateral negotiations.”
This statement indicated that China considered the ARF meeting an unsuitable 
channel for discussing South China Sea issues. This was an obvious challenge 
22 Interview with Greg Sheridan of the Australian. http://www.state.gov/secretary/
rm/2010/11/150671.htm (accessed May 20, 2012).
23 Ibid.
24 Straits Times, July 27, 2010.
25 Ian Storey, “China’s Missteps in Southeast Asia: Less Charm, More Offensive,” 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37294 
(accessed May 23, 2012).
26 “What Really Happened at the ARF?” http://cogitasia.com/what-really-happened-at-the-arf 
(accessed May 25, 2012); “Yang Jiechi Rebuffed the Distortion of the South China Sea Issue,” 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/zyxw/t719371.htm (accessed September 4, 2012 (Chi-
nese)).
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to ASEAN conference diplomacy, and Chinese diplomats were not successful. It 
can be said that host country Vietnam had the diplomatic advantage at ASEAN 
conferences, including ARF 2010.
After this meeting, Chinese leaders were more careful about using the term “core 
interest,” and the United States, ASEAN, and China have moved to calm tensions 
over the South China Sea, though the PLAN conducted the naval exercises at least 
three times in the South China Sea in 2010.27 One result of this positive diplomatic 
trend was the Guidelines for Implementation of the DOC,28 which ASEAN and 
Chinese diplomats had negotiated since 2005.
A senior South China Sea watcher has said that the draft was amended at least 
21 times.29 The Guidelines were finally agreed on at the ASEAN-China Ministerial 
Meeting in Bali in July 2011. The PLAN stopped naval exercises in the South 
China Sea. However, Chinese maritime security agencies such as the Chinese 
Fishery Department and the State Oceanic Administration were still active and 
disturbing oil detection and fishing by Vietnam and the Philippines in the South 
China Sea in 2011.30
China still had an inferior position at ASEAN conferences in 2011, but this 
improved during the ASEAN conferences in Phnom Penh in 2012. Even though 
Prime Minister Hun Sen’s army fought with the China-backed Khmer Rouge 
during the Cambodian Civil War in 1980, Cambodia was a close ally of China by 
the 2012 ASEAN conferences.
Hun Sen’s government and China made rapprochement after the civil war, and 
the Khmer Rouge ceased to exist in late 1990.31 China has also become a top-
donor and investor for Cambodia. Cambodia received US$ 1.19 billion in foreign 
direct investment from China in 2011, almost 10 times that from the United 
States,32 and has built some 1,500 km of roads, bridges, and power infrastructure. 
Chinese President Hu Jintao, and Secretary of the Central Commission for 
27 Straits Times, November 4, 2010; Asahi Shimbun, December 30, 2010. The third exercise, 
code named Jiaolong 2010 was the most provocative. It was based on the scenario of retaking 
South China Sea Islands occupied by foreign countries. China invited the military attaches of 
75 countries to Jiaolong 2010 and showed the Chinese will and capability to deploy their fleet 
in the South China Sea. Many neighboring countries felt that China’s threat was imminent.
28 Guidelines for Implementation of the DOC, http://aseansec.org/20185.htm (accessed 
October 6, 2012).
29 Carlyle A. Thayer, “Will the Guidelines to Implement the DOC Lessen Tensions in the South 
China Sea? An Assessment of Developments before and after Their Adoption” (conference 
paper for the 3rd International Workshop on the South China Sea, co-sponsored by the Vietnam 
Lawyers Association and the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, Hanoi, Vietnam, November 
3-5, 2011).
30 Ibid.
31 Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot died on April 15, 1998. Naoki Mabuchi, Pol Pot, My 
Impression (Shueisha Publishing, 2006).
32 Nirmal Ghosh, “Row Overshadows Summit,” Straits Times, July 16, 2012.
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Discipline Inspection He Guoqiang visited Cambodia in 2012, and the total 
amount of their official development assistance to the Cambodian government 
was said to be US$ 495 million.33
The 45th AMM and related meetings were held July 9-13, 2012. It was said 
that ASEAN members almost agreed on a draft of the code of conduct (COC) 
to prevent armed clashes over the South China Sea on July 9.34 Chinese Foreign 
Minister Yang Jiechi visited Cambodia on July 10, 2012, and said, “The Chinese 
side appreciates the long-standing, firm support of Cambodia for China on issues 
that concern China’s core interests.”35
At the AMM on July 13, ASEAN’s draft of COC was never published, and 
for the first time in its history ASEAN failed to produce a joint statement.36 How 
did this happen? The Philippines and Vietnam wanted the AMM joint statement 
to include a recent stand-off between a Philippine coast guard vessel and vessels 
of the Chinese Fishery Department at Scarborough Shoal, as well as the Sino-
Vietnamese territorial dispute of exclusive economic zones and continental 
shelves.
Most ASEAN members supported this inclusion, which would not be the first 
reference to the South China Sea, though the meeting’s chair, Cambodian Foreign 
Minister Hor Namhong, flatly refused because these disputes were bilateral 
issues, which supported China’s position.37 The Cambodian government rebuffed 
the rumor that China exercised influence on the AMM chairmanship, though a 
diplomat who attended the ASEAN conferences had the impression that China 
asked Cambodia to avoid using sensitive words related to the South China Sea.38 
U.S. State Secretary Clinton said at the ARF Ministerial Retreat that “ASEAN 
should speak with one voice on the South China Sea, and should have unity.”39
Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono deplored the non-issuance 
of the joint statement. He called all ASEAN leaders for unity and dispatched 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa to the Philippines, Vietnam, 
and Cambodia to renegotiate the ASEAN statement.40 Finally, ASEAN foreign 
33 Hiroshi Suzuki, “China Donates Big Amount of ODA to Cambodia,” http://thai-
plusone.asia/colum/bric20120614 (accessed July 20, 2012 (Japanese)).
34 Straits Times, July 10, 2012.
35 Nirmal Ghosh, “Row Overshadows Summit,” Straits Times, July 16, 2012. It was 
said that Yang’s comment was based on a Xinhua news report.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Author’s interview with an Asian diplomat on August 2, 2012.
39 Bangkok Post, “Clinton Urges ASEAN Unity over Islands,” July 13, 2012, http://www.
bangkokpost.com/print/302200 (accessed July 14, 2012).
40 Author’s interview with an Asian diplomat on August 2, 2012; Jakarta Post, “RI Finds 
Common ASEAN Ground in Sea Dispute,” July 23, 2012, http://www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2012/07/23/ri-finds-common-asean-ground-sea-dispute.html (accessed September 6, 
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ministers agreed on the “Statement of ASEAN Foreign Ministers on ASEAN’s 
Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea” on July 20, 2012.41 It can be said 
that Chinese diplomats were now at a superior position and their interference with 
ASEAN conference diplomacy had been successful.
4. Prospects of ASEAN Conference Diplomacy under 
Chinese Pressure
ASEAN conference diplomacy is an effective device for small and weak countries 
to cooperate with each other. However, it is not enough to settle territorial conflicts 
with external powers like China. First, maintaining dialogue is not likely to lead 
to settlement. Chinese diplomats can buy time while PLAN and Chinese maritime 
security agencies continue to occupy maritime features and disturb the fishing and 
oil detection of ASEAN claimants.
Second, the hosting and chairing of ASEAN conferences by Chinese close 
friends like Cambodia can hinder the settlement of South China Sea issues and 
ASEAN’s unity. China is not only a generous donor to Cambodia, but also an 
important investor in Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Singapore, and 
Thailand.42 ASEAN claimants of the South China Sea cannot depend on all of 
these countries to cooperate on statements and negotiations with China. China is 
skillful at using economic incentives toward political objectives.
Third, decision-making procedures based on consensus can be an obstacle for 
a COC on the South China Sea between ASEAN and China. China is likely to use 
these procedures for their own gain and resist the establishment of a multilateral 
legal framework for the South China Sea. Bilateral COCs, such as the Joint 
Statement on PRC-RP Consultations on the South China Sea and on Other Areas 
of Cooperation on August 9-10, 1995, and the Agreement on Basic Principles 
Guiding the Settlement of Sea-Related Issues between China and Vietnam on 
October 11, 2012, would be more effective even if their feasibility is doubtful.43
What can ASEAN do for the South China Sea conflict under Chinese pressure? 
It seems the peaceful settlement of the South China Sea conflict is difficult, if 
2012).
41 Statement of ASEAN Foreign Ministers on ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on South China 
Sea, http://www.mfaic.gov.kh/mofa/default.aspx?id=3206 (accessed July 21, 2012).
42 China Ministry of Commerce, China’s Commerce Annual Report 2011, (Beijing, 2011): 186-
187.
43 Joint Statement on PRC-RP Consultations on the South China Sea and on Other Areas of 
Cooperation, (August 10, 1995); Foreign Affairs Quarterly 1, no. 1 (January-March 1999); 
“VN-China Basic Principles on Settlement of Sea Issues,” http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Utilities/
PrintView.aspx?ID=21524 (accessed September 13, 2012).
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not impossible for ASEAN. Therefore, stable management of the conflict should 
be the objective of ASEAN’s conference diplomacy. This paper offers three 
recommendations toward this aim: first, defense and diplomatic cooperation 
with external dialogue partners; second, smart usage of the role of the Secretary 
General; third, a new idea.
First, Philippine Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago lamented on the current 
situation, “The Philippines is like a mosquito in the face of a dragon like China.” 
She recommended the Aquino administration to strengthen relations with its ally 
the United States.44 ASEAN claimants need some defense and maritime security 
cooperation with external dialogue partners such as the U.S., Japan, Australia, and 
India. Joint military exercises, weapons procurement, and coast guard exchanges 
are all possible, although too much provocation may be counterproductive. 
Diplomatic cooperation with the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India at ASEAN 
conferences such as the ARF, ADMM+8, and EAS is also indispensable. Even 
if these external partners cannot interfere in the territorial issues of the South 
China Sea, they can give statements on the freedom of navigation, try to persuade 
Chinese colleagues at conferences, and serve as a check on Chinese maritime 
adventurism.
Second, the role of the ASEAN Secretary General is also a key for the 
success of ASEAN conferences. Successful management of upcoming ASEAN 
conferences with expected hosts Brunei (2013), Myanmar (2014), and Malaysia 
(2015) will depend on the capability of the ASEAN Secretary General. It is not 
a well-known fact that the Secretary General is appointed on merit and accorded 
ministerial status45 so that he can coordinate his political power. Ex-Secretary 
General, Thai diplomat Dr. Surin Pitsuwan retired from the office in December 
2012. The current Secretary General is Mr. Le Luong Minh, a former Vietnamese 
deputy foreign minister. He will take over some part of the responsibility for the 
conference management.
Third, there is an idea for a new ASEAN conference. Ambassador Hasjim 
Djalal, a prominent Indonesian diplomat on maritime affairs, suggested a cocktail 
party-style semi-official ministerial conference among members, equivalent to the 
Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM) on Cambodia in the late 1980s.46 This idea would 
resemble the ASEAN Ministerial Retreats.
44 Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 13, 2012 http://globalnation.inquirer.net/44005/santiago-
philippines-like-a-mosquito-in-the-face-of-a-dragon-like-china (accessed September 30, 2012).
45 Singapore Declaration of 1992, (ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting, Singapore, 
January 27-28, 1992) http://www.aseansec.org (accessed October 10, 2012).
46 Ambassador Hasjim Djalal’s comment at the 3rd International Workshop on the South China 
Sea, co-sponsored by the Vietnam Lawyers Association and the Diplomatic Academy of 
Vietnam, Hanoi, Vietnam, November 5, 2011; Koichi Sato, “South China Sea Conflict: Long 
Term Support Is Necessary,” Asahi Shinbun, January 17, 2012.
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It may also be useful to discuss the practice of cooperative activities such as 
maritime environmental protection, marine scientific research, safety of navigation 
and communication at sea, search and rescue operations, and combating 
transnational crime like piracy. Pending comprehensive and durable settlements, 
these activities can be admitted in the DOC.47 If agreements can be reached on 
these activities, ASEAN and China may ask for financial and logistic assistance 
from other external partners.48
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